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Abstract
Background: In response to increasing fiscal pressures, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) sought to reduce Medicare
Advantage plan expenses by restructuring the bidding and payment processes. The purpose of this study is to
assess the effects of the ACA’s payment freeze and restructuring of the bidding and payment processes on
favorable risk selection in Medicare Advantage plan enrollment (objective 1) and changes in the health status of
beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans over time (objective 2).
Methods: We used the Medicare Health Outcome Survey baseline data (2007→2013) for analyses of the first
objective (7 cohorts, 1.7 million beneficiaries) and the linked baseline and follow-up data (2007–2009→2011–2013)
for analyses of the second objective (5 cohorts, 0.5 million beneficiaries). To examine favorable risk selection we
used the following outcomes: self-rated health, falls, balance problems, falls management, frailty, and morbidity. To
examine changes in beneficiary health status over time, we examined changes (over time) in these same outcomes.
The focal independent variable is the policy implementation measure, which is time dependent and measures the
accumulation of changes to Medicare Advantage payment policies resulting from the ACA. Multiple regression
models were developed to examine the relationship between ACA implementation and outcomes of interest.
Results: In terms of favorable selection, individuals enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans post-ACA have, on
average, better self-rated health (b = 0.003, p < 0.01), lower odds of falls (AOR = 0.981, p < 0.001), higher odds of falls
management (AOR = 1.040, p < 0.001), lower frailty risks (IRR = 0.983, p < 0.001), and lower risks of comorbidities
(IRR = 0.989, p < 0.001). In terms of health status changes over time, the results indicate that in the post-ACA period,
beneficiaries reported better self-rated health (b = 0.028, p < 0.001), lower odds of falls (AOR = 0.965, p < 0.001),
lower odds of balance problems (AOR = 0.958, p < 0.001), lower odds of falls management (AOR = 0.981, p < 0.05),
lower frailty risks (IRR = 0.944, p < 0.001), and lower risks of comorbidity (IRR = 0.986, p < 0.001) at follow up
compared to the same risks at baseline.
Conclusions: These findings suggest that as the Medicare Advantage payment policies in the ACA were being
implemented, plans may have engaged in favorable selection activities, yet beneficiaries exhibited more favorable
health outcomes.
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Background
Medicare Advantage (MA) - offered by private plans - is a
market-based managed care alternative to the traditional
fee-for-service (FFS) model that provides Medicare benefi-
ciaries with both Part A (inpatient services) and Part B
(outpatient services) benefits. Through contracted ar-
rangements with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), the private managed care plans are paid a
preset per member per month (capitation) payment ac-
cording to certain benchmarks following a bidding process
that determines the maximum amount Medicare will pay.
In 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment and Modernization Act (MMA) increased federal
payments to MA plans to expand their role under Medi-
care and offer beneficiaries a wider choice of plans as
well as access to extra benefits. By 2010, this led to an
increase in the ratio of per-capita payments for MA
beneficiaries compared to the cost of care under the
traditional FFS Medicare (113 % of average per-capita
costs under FFS Medicare), and greater MA market
penetration (25 %) [1]. The cost of these higher pay-
ments for an expanding proportion of beneficiaries was
one of the core factors threatening Medicare’s fiscal
sustainability.
In response to these fiscal pressures and to partially
cover the added costs associated with expanding health
insurance coverage to millions of previously uninsured
Americans, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) of 2010 set about to reduce MA plan pay-
ments using three distinct policy levers. The first was
freezing MA 2011 payments at their 2010 levels [2]. The
second was phasing-in restructured bidding and pay-
ment processes that used blended benchmarks set at in-
creasingly lower percentages of FFS Medicare rates.
Blending now primarily reflects county rather than na-
tional costs, with benchmarks set at 95 % for counties in
the highest FFS spending quartile, and 100, 107.5, and
115 % for counties in the progressively lower spending
quartiles [2]. When fully implemented it is estimated this
will result in a 13 % reduction or about $1,538 per-
capita in MA payments, with substantial variation in re-
duction amounts by county [3, 4]. These policies are
planned to be phased-in over 2–6 years 2011–2017) de-
pending on the amount of the plan’s anticipated
payment reduction, with earlier phase-ins for lower re-
ductions and longer phase-ins for higher reductions [5].
The third lever was the linkage of rebate and bonus pay-
ments to the quality of care that plans provided. The quality
scores for MA plans are based on a set of performance
measures assessing plans’ processes, management of
chronic conditions, beneficiaries’ health, and member
experience and customer service [6, 7]. MA plans are rated
on a 1 to 5 star scale, with 1 star representing poor per-
formance, and 5 stars representing excellent performance.
Rebate rates range from 70 % for plans with 4.5 or 5 Medi-
care quality stars, to 50 % for those with 3 or fewer quality
stars [5]. Plans with 3 or more Medicare quality stars will
get a 5 % bonus with 3 % going to lower quality plans.
MA plans have always had the incentive to engage in
favorable risk selection practices by targeting healthier,
lower-cost beneficiaries to encourage them to enroll in
MA. Favorable selection means beneficiaries who cost
less-than-average disproportionately enroll in MA, while
those who cost more-than-average disproportionately re-
main in traditional FFS Medicare [8]. The MA payment
changes brought about by the ACA may have stimulated
plans to intensify their favorable risk selection efforts,
improve their Medicare quality star ratings, reduce or
constrain the health services they provide, or raise their
bids above the benchmark, which may have led to
changes in beneficiary health outcomes.
Several studies have examined the potential effects of
these and other policy changes on MA-to-FFS and FFS-
to-MA switching, plan selection, plan availability, plan
quality star ratings, race/ethnic plan composition, and
favorable selection [2–4, 8–19]. These studies reflect
varying conclusions and trends, including reductions in
the number of available plans [10], reductions in the ra-
tio of MA plan payments to average per-capita costs
under FFS Medicare from 14 to 9 % [4], declines in fa-
vorable selection [8, 9, 11], increased dis-enrollment
rates among dual-eligible and disability-eligible benefi-
ciaries [7], modest changes in enrollee risk scores [15],
increased member monthly premiums among higher
quality plans that were also more likely to drop their $0
premium plans [13], no significant reductions in health
services provided or increases in beneficiary costs [14],
higher switching rates from MA to FFS than from FFS
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to MA [16], diminished returns to plan quality on bene-
ficiary plan choice at higher plan quality levels with plan
choice influenced primarily by plan market share [17],
little evidence of MA plans under-enrolling race and
ethnic minorities [18], and higher quality ratings linked
to nonprofit status and plan endurance (age) [19].
While these studies have examined the effects of
ACA-induced MA policy changes on different dimen-
sions, the majority rely on only 1–2 years of data, none
have used data more recent than 2011, and none have
focused on beneficiary health outcomes. To that end,
this paper aims to focus on the effects at the beneficiary
level of the ACA’s payment freeze and newly blended
benchmarks on favorable risk selection in enrollments
(objective 1) and changes in the health status of benefi-
ciaries enrolled in MA plans (objective 2) over time.
Methods
Data sources and study population
We used the Medicare Health Outcome Survey (HOS)
developed by CMS for all analyses. The HOS is an an-
nual patient-reported survey dataset compiled from a
nationally representative random sample of beneficiaries
enrolled in MA plans with at least 500 members. It is
used by CMS to monitor and evaluate the quality of
health care provided to MA plan beneficiaries and to set
MA plan payment, rebate, and bonus levels. The survey
is administered to a new baseline cohort of MA plan
beneficiaries every year who are then resurveyed for
follow-up after 2 years. The survey protocol includes four
main components: (i) the Veterans RAND 12-Item Health
Survey (VR-12); (ii) case-mix and risk-adjustment ques-
tions; (iii) questions that tap on HEDIS Effectiveness of
Care measures; and (iv) additional health questions (e.g.,
cognitive function, memory, living arrangements) [20].
The analytic sample was limited to individuals who
were age-eligible for Medicare (aged 65 years old or
older). We used seven consecutive HOS cohorts: Cohort
10 (2007–2009) to Cohort 16 (2013–2015). Specifically,
we used only baseline data (2007→2013) for the analyses
of the first objective (7 cohorts and 1.7 million benefi-
ciaries) and the linked baseline and follow-up data
(2007–2009→2011–2013) for the analyses of the second
objective (5 cohorts and 0.5 million beneficiaries; follow-
up data for Cohorts 15 and 16 have not yet been re-
leased at the time of data analysis).
Dependent variables
To examine favorable risk selection into MA plans we
used the following outcomes at baseline: self-rated
health (SRH), falls, balance problems, falls management,
frailty, and morbidity. And to examine changes in bene-
ficiary health status over time, we looked at changes in
these same outcomes after 2 years. SRH is the traditional
self-assessment of beneficiaries’ perceived health status,
in which beneficiaries were asked to respond to the
question “In general, would you say your health is:” and
the response items were “Excellent”, “Very Good”,
“Good”, “Fair”, “Poor”. The SRH variable was coded
from 1 “Poor” to 5 “Excellent”.
Falls is a binary variable for falls in the previous year,
in which beneficiaries were asked to respond to the
question “Did you fall in the past 12 months?” and is
coded 1 for “Yes”. Balance problems is a binary indicator
for problems with balance or walking, in which benefi-
ciaries were asked to respond to the question “In the
past 12 months, have you had a problem with balance or
walking?” and is coded 1 for “Yes”. Falls management is
a binary indicator for discussion with a doctor about
how to prevent falls, in which beneficiaries were asked
to respond to the question “A fall is when your body
goes to the ground without being pushed. In the past
12 months, did you talk with your doctor or other health
provider about falling or problems with balance or walk-
ing?” and coded 1 for “Yes”.
Frailty is a count variable reflecting the number of im-
pairments in the activities of daily living (ADLs): bath-
ing, dressing, eating, getting in or out of chairs, walking,
and using the toilet. Beneficiaries’ were asked to respond
to the following question “Because of a health or phys-
ical problem, do you have any difficulty doing the fol-
lowing activities without special equipment or help from
another person?”. Individual ADL item responses were
first transformed to binary indicators coded 1 for “Yes, I
have difficulty” or “I am unable to do this activity” and 0
for “No, I do not have difficulty”. The Frailty variable is
the numeric sum of the 6 individual indicators of ADL.
Morbidity is a count variable of the number of mor-
bidities reported by beneficiaries in response to “Has a
doctor ever told you that you had:”. Responses were bin-
ary (Yes/No) for each of the following 13 health condi-
tions: hypertension, angina, congestive heart failure,
myocardial infraction, other heart condition, stroke, em-
physema, inflammatory bowel disease, arthritis of hip or
knee, arthritis of hand or wrist, sciatica, diabetes, any
cancer. The morbidity score is the numeric sum of the
13 individual indicators of health condition truncated at
7 comorbidities (i.e., individuals with 8 conditions or
more [3 % of the sample size] were assigned to ‘7’). Simi-
lar weight was applied to all activities of daily living and
chronic conditions in the calculations of ADL and mor-
bidity scores.
Independent variables
The focal independent variable in this study is the policy
implementation measure (PIM), which is time-dependent
and measures the accumulation of changes to MA pay-
ment policies resulting from the ACA. PIM is set at ‘0’ for
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each of the pre-ACA years (2007–2010), ‘1’ for 2011 to re-
flect the freeze in MA plan payments at their 2010 levels,
‘2’ for 2012 to account for the original payment freeze and
the restructuring of the bidding and payment processes
(first set of county-based cuts), and ‘4’ for 2013 to account
for the original payment freeze, the first and second set of
county-based cuts, and sequestration (which began in
2013 as part of the 2011 Budget Control Act) [21]. We in-
cluded a time-dependent secular trend measure coded ‘1’
for 2007 through ‘7’ for 2013 to adjust for temporal
changes in the outcomes of interest between 2007 and
2013. We also adjusted for age, sex, race-ethnicity, educa-
tion, marital status, and health status.
Data analysis
Objective 1
To assess whether the payment changes led to favorable
risk selection in MA plan enrollment, we examined
changes over time in health characteristics using base-
line data from 2007 to 2013. The model is expressed as:
Y 1 ¼ aþ β1PIM þ β2Trend þ β3Dem
þ β4Healthþ e ð1Þ
where Y1 is the health outcome at baseline (either SRH,
falls, balance problems, falls management, frailty, or
morbidity), PIM is the policy implementation measure,
Trend is the secular trend indicator, Dem includes pa-
tient demographic characteristics (i.e., age, sex, race-
ethnicity, education, marital status), and Health includes
health status measures other than the outcome of inter-
est. We introduced patient demographics and health sta-
tus variables (Dem and Health) successively in a 3-step
fashion (stepwise regression). The first model includes
the two focal variables of interest (i.e., secular trend and
policy effect). The second model includes patient demo-
graphics (age, sex, race-ethnicity, education, and marital
status) in addition to the two focal variables of interest.
The third model is the complete (and preferred) model
and adjusts for health status of the individuals (SRH,
falls, balance problems, falls management, frailty, and
morbidity) in addition to their demographics. A health
status adjustor variable is not included when it is the
dependent variable. For quasi-interval outcomes (SRH)
we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, for
count outcomes (frailty and morbidity) we use negative
binomial regression models, and for binary outcomes
(falls, balance problems, and falls management) we use
logistic regression models [22, 23].
Objective 2
To assess whether the payment changes induced by the
ACA led to changes in beneficiaries’ health status over
time, we examined temporal changes in the health status
of MA beneficiaries. The full model is expressed as:
Y 2 ¼ aþ β0Ybaseline þ β1PIM þ β2Trend
þ β3Demþ β4Healthþ e ð2Þ
where Y2 is the follow-up value for the outcome of interest
(either SRH, falls, balance problems, falls management,
frailty, or morbidity). The predictor variables are the same
as used in the first objective, except that the baseline value
of the outcome measure of interest (Ybaseline) is included.
For quasi-interval (SRH) outcomes we use ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression, for count outcomes (frailty and
morbidity) we use negative binomial regression models,
and for binary outcomes (falls, balance problems, and falls
management) we use logistic regression models [22, 23].
Data were analyzed with SPSS Statistics version 22.0 soft-
ware (IBM SPSS, Inc, NY).
Results
Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics and
health status of the MA beneficiaries included in the
analytic sample for each of the two objectives. At base-
line for objective 1, more than half of the beneficiaries
were females (58.5 %), married (54.2 %), or between 65
and 74 years old (58.2 %). The majority were white
(81.1 %) and more than one-third had greater than a
high school education (38.8 %). In terms of health status,
on average, 30.3 % rated their health as below average
(fair or poor), 23.0 % fell in the previous 12 months,
one-third experienced problems in balance or walking
(33.5 %) and 30.7 % talked to the doctor about fall pre-
vention. On average, the MA enrollees had a single dis-
ability (ADL score of 0.99) and three comorbidities
(morbidity score of 2.86). The characteristics of objective
2 population at baseline were very similar to those for
objective 1.
Unadjusted trends of health status measures at base-
line showed that between 2007 and 2009, beneficiaries
showed a decreasing trend in SRH that was reversed in
2010. In addition, falls and balance problems among
beneficiaries at baseline were increasing prior to 2010,
but this trend was halted in 2010. Frailty and morbidity
among beneficiaries at baseline was increasing prior to
2010, but decreased after the changes in MA reimburse-
ment policies began.
Objective 1
Table 2 shows the results of the regression models asses-
sing favorable risk selection in the enrollment of benefi-
ciaries in MA plans. The first model shows the
unadjusted effects of the policy implementation and
secular trend variables. The second and third models
successively adjust for demographics and health status.
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The results indicate that after adjustment for demo-
graphics and health status, individuals enrolled in MA
plans post-2010 (the year in which changes in MA
reimbursement started to take effect) have, on average,
better SRH (b = 0.003, p < 0.01), lower odds of falls
(AOR = 0.981, p < 0.001), higher odds of falls
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable N (%)
Objective 1 Objective 2 at Baseline Objective 2 at Follow up
n = 1,658,453 n = 546,362 n = 546,362
Age
65 to 74 964,956 (58.2) 324,065 (59.3)
75 and older 693,497 (41.8) 222,297 (40.7)
Gender
Female 938,226 (58.5) 318,329 (58.9)
Male 666,270 (41.5) 221,773 (41.1)
Race
White 1,190,929 (81.1) 440,198 (83.3)
Black or African American 144,437 (9.8) 42,722 (8.1)
Other 132,635 (9.0) 45,814 (8.7)
Marital Status
Married 816,103 (54.2) 306,183 (56.9)
Non-married 688,321 (45.8) 231,489 (43.1)
Education
Less than high school education or equivalent 397,151 (26.6) 130,480 (24.4)
High school education or equivalent 518,306 (34.7) 194,584 (36.3)
Greater than high school education or equivalent 579,193 (38.8) 210,315 (39.3)
Self-Rated Health (SRH)
Excellent 102,591 (6.5) 35,892 (6.7) 30,871 (5.7)
Very good 393,205 (25.0) 148,911 (27.6) 138,340 (26.3)
Good 599,089 (38.2) 216,901 (40.3) 208,904 (39.7)
Fair 370,320 (23.6) 114,631 (21.0) 119,286 (22.6)
Poor 104,673 (6.7) 22,406 (4.1) 29,331 (5.6)
Falls
Did not fall 1,163,694 (77.0) 428,294 (78.4) 400,071 (77.3)
Fell to the ground 347,670 (23.0) 110,755 (20.5) 117,289 (22.7)
Balance Problems
No 1,002,304 (66.5) 379,692 (70.5) 338,669 (65.7)
Yes 505,307 (33.5) 158,532 (29.5) 177,149 (34.3)
Falls Management
No 1,019,652 (69.3) 389,581 (74.1) 348,958 (69.2)
Yes 451,062 (30.7) 135,948 (25.9) 155,283 (30.8)
Variable (range) Mean (SD)
Objective 1 Objective 2 at Baseline Objective 2 at Follow up
Frailty - ADL Scorea (0–6) 0.99 (1.66) 0.79 (1.44) 0.95 (1.60)
Morbidity Scoreb (0–7) 2.86 (1.93) 2.76 (1.88) 2.88 (1.90)
aActivities of daily living (ADL) score calculated as the sum of the six disability components (binary indicators): bathing, dressing, eating, getting in or out of chair,
walking and using the toilet
bMorbidity score is the sum of 13 comorbidity dummy indicators truncated at 7 comorbidities
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management (AOR = 1.040, p < 0.001), lower frailty risks
(IRR = 0.983, p < 0.001), and lower risks of comorbidities
(IRR = 0.989, p < 0.001).
Objective 2
Table 3 shows the results of the models assessing the
changes in health status over time associated with the
MA reimbursement reform introduced in 2010. The re-
sults indicate that post reimbursement changes, benefi-
ciaries, on average, reported statistically higher SRH (b
= 0.028, p < 0.001), lower odds of falls (AOR = 0.965, p <
0.001) and balance problems (AOR = 0.958, p < 0.001),
lower odds of falls management (AOR = 0.981, p < 0.05),
and lower frailty (IRR = 0.944, p < 0.001) and fewer co-
morbidities (IRR = 0.986, p < 0.001) at follow-up com-
pared to baseline.
Discussion
There is limited information about the effects of the
ACA on MA plan behavior and beneficiary health. This
study is important because it fills gaps in the literature
and provides policymakers with critical information that
is needed to shape policy development. This work pro-
vides preliminary evidence on favorable selection in MA
enrollment and MA beneficiary health over time in re-
sponse to ACA changes in MA payment policies.
The results indicate that, as the ACA is being imple-
mented, MA plans are seeking to recruit healthier se-
niors during enrollment suggesting intensified efforts at
favorable risk selection. While this is not surprising [1,
11, 24, 25], it is an important finding because it signals a
reverse in the recent success of Medicare efforts to re-
duce favorable risk selection in MA plans by revising the
risk adjustment formula and restricting monthly disen-
rollment by beneficiaries [8, 9].
Based on earlier evidence, some studies anticipated a
decrease in enrollment of new beneficiaries in MA plans
associated with a substantial period of disenrollment
when current enrollees return to FFS Medicare [8]. Such
predictions appear to be only partially correct. Recent
updates on MA enrollment show an increase in the
number and share of Medicare beneficiaries in MA plans
after the ACA [25]. However, the newly enrolled benefi-
ciaries in MA plans tend to be healthier individuals with
less frailty and fewer comorbidities. This is consistent
with recent evidence indicating that the switching rate
from 2010 to 2011 away from MA and to FFS Medicare
exceeded the rate in the opposite direction for partici-
pants, particularly among high-cost patients [16].
Another noteworthy finding of this study is the
changes in health status of MA beneficiaries associated
with the changes in MA payment policy. Despite the im-
portance of health outcomes assessment as efforts to
Table 2 First Objective - Favorable risk selection in enrollment
Dependent Variable Focal Variablea Model 1b Model 2c Model 3d
Effecte (SE) Effecte (SE) Effecte (SE)
Self-Rated Health (SRH) Secular Trend 0.002 (0.001) −0.005 (0.001)*** 0.008 (0.001)***
Policy Measure 0.020 (0.001)*** 0.014 (0.001)*** 0.003 (0.001)**
Falls Secular Trend 1.020 (0.002)*** 1.025 (0.002)*** 1.003 (0.003)
Policy Measure 0.976 (0.003)*** 0.975 (0.003)*** 0.981 (0.003)***
Balance Problems Secular Trend 1.022 (0.002)*** 1.032 (0.002)*** 0.994 (0.003)*
Policy Measure 0.984 (0.003)*** 0.986 (0.003)*** 1.006 (0.004)
Falls Management Secular Trend 1.043 (0.002)*** 1.057 (0.002)*** 1.044 (0.003)***
Policy Measure 1.006 (0.003)* 1.009 (0.003)** 1.040 (0.003)***
Frailty/disability Secular Trend 1.025 (0.001)*** 1.033 (0.001)*** 1.013 (0.002)***
Policy Measure 0.969 (0.002)*** 0.973 (0.002)*** 0.983 (0.002)***
Morbidity Score Secular Trend 1.011 (0.001)*** 1.013 (0.001)*** 1.008 (0.001)***
Policy Measure 0.983 (0.002)*** 0.985 (0.002)*** 0.989 (0.002)***
Significance level: * p-value <0.05; ** p-value <0.01; *** p-value <0.001. Due to space limitations, only focal variables of interest were displayed. Complete tables
including coefficients of all included variables are available upon request
aSecular Trend is a time-dependent indicator that captures any temporal changes in the outcomes of interest over time between 2007 and 2013; Policy Measure
is the policy implementation measure (PIM) which reflects the changes in MA reimbursement
bModel 1 includes (i) secular trend variable and (ii) policy effect
cModel 2 includes (i), (ii), and (iii) demographics (age, sex, race-ethnicity, education, and marital status)
dModel 3 includes (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) health status (SRH, falls, balance problems, falls management, frailty [when Balance is the DV, ADL score is calculated
excluding walking disability component], and morbidity). A health status adjustor variable is not included when it is the DV
eBeta Coefficient Effect for OLS predicting SRH; Adjusted Odds Ratio [OR = Exp (B)] predicting falls, balance problems and falls management; Incidence Risk Ratio
[IRR = Exp (B)] for Negative Binomial Regression predicting frailty and morbidity
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contain health care costs and concerns about the quality
of care increases, there is little evidence on health status
of MA beneficiaries. A single study compared MAs and
the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) with regard
to changes in health status and mortality [26]. The au-
thors concluded that there were small differences in 2-
year health outcomes that favored the VHA.
Our results indicate that in the post-ACA period, MA
enrollees had improved SRH, fewer falls, lower frailty
scores, and fewer comorbidities. This could be attributed
to MA plans’ increased focus on prevention, coordinated
care, and better management of chronic conditions asso-
ciated with the reimbursement reform efforts that linked
MA payments to certain outcome measures. The fixed
capitation payment scheme, in addition to the financial
rewards under ACA for receiving a higher rating based
on performance on measures of quality and patient ex-
perience, provides strong incentives to provide more co-
ordinated, effective, and efficient care [4, 27].
Despite these efforts to enhance the quality of care
and improve patient outcomes, the findings indicate that
in the same post-ACA period MA enrollees had lower
odds of receiving an appropriate management of fall
risks. One possible explanation may be that the plans
are only focusing on the performance measures outlined
by CMS under the ACA, which focus on: (i) how often
members got various screening tests, vaccines, and other
check-ups that help them stay healthy; (ii) how often
members with different conditions got certain tests and
treatments that help them manage their conditions; (iii)
ratings of member satisfaction with the plan [4]. Since it
is not one of the explicit measures required for MA plan
payment bonuses and given the prevalence of fall risk
among Medicare beneficiaries and the multiple providers
who would require payment, the plans seems not to be
focusing on fall-risk evaluation and management ser-
vices due to their substantial costs [28].
This study is limited in three important ways. First, the
study design cannot tease out other policies that could
have affected MA plans post-2010 such as the American
Taxpayer Relief Act and the Budget Control Act. None-
theless, both of those Acts are believed to have had min-
imal effects on the observed outcomes, as they were only
effective as of 2013 and their effect was incorporated in
the PIM. The second limitation is the relatively modest
longitudinal post-ACA run of the data. Nonetheless, we
did observe significant effects in the short-term. Lastly,
this study does not account for differences in plan charac-
teristics or the actual changes in MA payments. It is ex-
pected that the effects of the PIM will vary by county
characteristics, such as market competition and/or pene-
tration rates, as well as plan characteristics. Because these
discounts are being phased in over 2–6 years, the first two
years available for analysis in this paper reflect the correct
proportional changes anticipated in the payment policies.
Future research should expand the longitudinal run of the
data and focus on changes in the outcomes associated
with variations in plan and geographic characteristics.
Table 3 Second Objective - Changes in health status
Dependent Variable Focal Variablea Model 1b Model 2c Model 3d
Effect (SE) Effect (SE) Effect (SE)
Self-Rated Health (SRH) Secular Trend −0.022 (0.002)*** −0.019 (0.002)*** −0.015 (0.002)***
Policy Measure 0.034 (0.002)*** 0.028 (0.002)*** 0.028 (0.002)***
Falls Secular Trend 1.034 (0.009)*** 1.029 (0.009)** 1.020 (0.009)*
Policy Measure 0.958 (0.008)*** 0.965 (0.008)*** 0.965 (0.008)***
Balance Problems Secular Trend 1.064 (0.009)*** 1.055 (0.009)*** 1.049 (0.009)***
Policy Measure 0.944 (0.008)*** 0.958 (0.008)*** 0.958 (0.008)***
Falls Management Secular Trend 1.093 (0.008)*** 1.083 (0.008)*** 1.073 (0.009)***
Policy Measure 0.951 (0.008)*** 0.971 (0.008)*** 0.981 (0.008)*
Frailty/disability Secular Trend 1.056 (0.006)*** 1.049 (0.006)*** 1.043 (0.006)***
Policy Measure 0.930 (0.005)*** 0.943 (0.005)*** 0.944 (0.005)***
Morbidity Score Secular Trend 1.005 (0.004) 1.004 (0.004) 1.005 (0.004)
Policy Measure 0.984 (0.004)*** 0.986 (0.004)*** 0.986 (0.004)***
Significance level: * p-value <0.05 **; p-value <0.01; *** p-value <0.001. Due to space limitations, only focal variables of interest were displayed. Complete tables
including coefficients of all included variables are available upon request
aSecular Trend is a time-dependent indicator that captures any temporal changes in the outcomes of interest over time between 2007 and 2013; Policy Measure
is the policy implementation measure (PIM) which reflects the changes in MA reimbursement
bModel 1 includes (i) secular trend variable, (ii) policy effect, (iii) outcome indicator at baseline
cModel 2 includes (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) demographics (age, sex, race-ethnicity, education, and marital status)
dModel 3 includes (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) health status (SRH, falls, balance problems, falls management, frailty [when Balance is the DV, ADL score is calculated
excluding walking disability component], and morbidity). A health status adjustor variable is not included when it is the DV
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Conclusions
This study reflects the first effort to evaluate the effects
of the ACA-induced MA payment changes on health
outcomes of MA enrollees. The evidence suggests that
as the ACA payment policies were being implemented,
MA plans engaged in favorable selection activities, yet
their beneficiaries exhibited more favorable health out-
comes over time.
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